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ABSTRACT
The paper addresses the problem of fraudulent contracting of work in the Swedish road freight 
transport industry with a focus on false (bogus) self-employment. The aim is to discuss the wider 
social context of the problem and to illustrate the significance of the mandatory Swedish notion of 
employee when identifying and tackling misclassification of drivers’ employment status. By analyz-
ing a case in this industry that has been tried in the Swedish Labor Court, and a related case that 
resulted in conciliation, the paper illustrates both the strength and limitation of labor law for coun-
teracting disguised employment. The study also exemplifies why the notion of employee has been 
an argument against new regulations aimed to protect workers in the grey area between employ-
ment and self-employment. In addition to written sources, the paper draws upon interviews with 
informants from the Swedish Transport Workers’ Union, the industry and the Swedish Tax Agency. 
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Introduction 
Fraudulent contracting of work in the grey area between genuine forms of employ-ment and self-employment is a source of low-wage competition and social dump-ing.1 The notion of fraudulent contracting of work refers to arrangements that are 
intended to appear as regular forms of contracts, but these contracts disguise a dis-
tinct employment relationship and/or conceal who is the real employer. In other words, 
‘fraudulent contracting of work constitutes an abuse of existing legal employment or 
contractual relationships’ (Eurofound 2016, p. 7). False (bogus) self-employment (dis-
guised employment) is one of the most evident examples of this practice. Misclassifica-
tion of truck drivers as self-employed workers has been a much-discussed issue in the 
road freight transport industry in the 2000s, especially in the context of increasing low-
cost competition within the enlarged European Union (EU) (Thörnquist 2013, 2015; 
Muller 2014; Broughton et al. 2015; Haidinger 2017). 
In most legal systems, including Nordic and EU labor law, there is a binary division 
between dependent (subordinate) employment and independent self-employment. An 
employee shall work under the direction and control of the employer, while a genuinely 
self-employed person shall operate as an independent contractor (Adlercreutz 1964; 
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Källström 2002; Engblom 2003; Verhulp 2017). In practice, however, atypical arrange-
ments in the grey area between these main categories have become more and more 
common along with structural changes in the organization of production and work, 
including the use of new technology, new business strategies and increasing internation-
alization of the labor market (Collins 1990; Supiot 2001; Perulli 2003; Muehlberger 
2009; Eurofound 2013, 2016). 
In the ‘grey area’, we find dependent self-employment, referring to own-account 
self-employed service providers, who may use their own tools and equipment and take 
entrepreneurial risk (e.g., truck drivers with own trucks) but who do not operate inde-
pendently in relation to the principal (often one single principal) (ILO 2003; Muhl-
berger 2007; Pedersini & Coletto 2009). Sometimes the principal is worker’s the former 
employer, who thus can benefit from flexibility and, at the same time, transfer risk to 
the worker. The other category is false (bogus) self-employment, that is, subordinate 
employment disguised as self-employment. False self-employed workers are formally 
self-employed, who are in fact working as employees, but without the rights and protec-
tion employees are entitled to in a regular contract of employment (ILO 2003; Perulli 
2003; Verhulp 2017). The aim is to reduce labor costs by circumventing employers’ reg-
ular responsibilities laid down in laws and collective agreements. Thus, misclassification 
of workers’ true employment status undermines established labor standards and implies 
a high risk of precarious work and labor abuse. In addition, it means unfair competition 
and loss of government revenue. 
Work in the grey area between employment and self-employment is not a new phe-
nomenon. Ever since the introduction of labor laws and collective agreements, there 
have been strategies aimed to circumvent these regulations. Ambiguous and disguised 
forms of employment have long been used both as a mode of exploitation and a strategy 
for survival in the labor market, especially in times of crisis and unemployment. Like 
several other so-called new forms of employment, work in the grey area is both a pre- 
and post-Fordist phenomenon (Thörnquist 2011, 2013). In the Fordist labor market 
regime, the norm was full-time and permanent employment (at least for the white male 
worker) in vertically integrated companies. Standard employment still refers to these 
criteria, while various forms of fixed-term and part-time employment, as well as the use 
of self-employed and temporary agency workers instead of directly employed workers, 
refer to ‘non-standard employment’ (Collins 1990; Supiot 2001; Fudge 2017). 
The aim of the paper 
The paper addresses the problem fraudulent contracting of work in the Swedish road 
freight transport industry with a focus on false (bogus) self-employment. Misclassifica-
tion of truck drivers as self-employed workers has mainly been identified in nonspecial-
ized long-haul trucking and port-trucking. As in other countries in Western and North-
ern Europe, road freight transport carried out by truck tractors pulling trailers and 
containers are highly exposed to international low-cost competition. In this sector—in 
Sweden commonly called ‘the truck tractor sector’ (dragbilsbranschen)—we also find 
the most interchangeable drivers. Hooking and dropping loaded trailers and containers 
require less communication with customers and terminal staff than most other transport 
operations (ETF 2013, 2015; Sitran & Pastori 2013; Transport 2018). 
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The aim of the paper is to discuss the wider social context of this practice and 
to illustrate the significance of the flexible and mandatory Swedish civil law notion 
of employee when identifying and tackling misclassification of workers’ true employ-
ment status. The paper analyzes a case of false self-employment in the road freight 
transport industry that has been tried in the Swedish Labor Court, and a related case 
that the parties—a private road haulage company and the Swedish Transport Workers’ 
Union (Transport)—eventually resolved in conciliation. The analysis illustrates both the 
strength and limitation of labor law when tackling issues on misclassification. The paper 
also exemplifies and discusses why the mandatory notion of employee has been used as 
an argument against new regulations aimed to protect workers in the grey area between 
employment and self-employment. 
International research has increasingly addressed the use of dependent and false 
forms of self-employment as a national and international labor market phenomenon. 
Studies have highlighted this problem in labor-intensive industries, such as transport, 
construction and cleaning (e.g., Thörnquist 2013; Muller 2014; Behling & Harvey 
2015; Broughton et al. 2015). Research has also shown that dependent self-employment 
has become more and more common in recent decades among professionals, consul-
tants and other high-skilled service providers, as well as among workers in arts, culture 
and media (Muehlbeger 2007; Kautonen & Palmroos 2009; Eurofound 2016; Werne 
2016). Moreover, fraudulent use of self-employment in the ‘gig economy’ has gained 
increasing interest among researchers (De Stefano 2016; Bögenhold et al. 2017; Euro-
found 2017; Westregård 2017). Like certain other forms of nonstandard (atypical) 
employment, dependent self-employment does not necessarily mean precarious work, 
and both parties may find the arrangement advantageous. However, work in the grey 
area between genuine forms of employment and self-employment implies economic and 
social risks for the party who performs the work, especially for low-skilled workers 
with a weak position in the labor market (ILO 2003; Perulli 2003; Casale 2011; Behling 
& Harvey 2015).
Regarding the road freight transport industry, international research has discussed 
the problem of fraudulent use of self-employment in the light of the deregulation and lib-
eralization of this market and related changes in the industry structure, in business strat-
egies and in industrial relations (Belzer 2000; Bensman 2009; 2014: Jaffee and Bensman 
2016; Viscelli 2016). In European studies, the problem has mainly been related to the free 
movement of services and labor within the EU, including the possibility to exploit the 
economic and social cleft between East and West after the eastward enlargement of the 
Union in the 2000s (Hilal 2008; Thörnquist 2013, 2015; Muller 2014; Broughton et al. 
2015; Guaman & Loffredo 2017; Haidinger 2017). 
Methodology
The paper draws upon both oral information and a variety of written sources. The anal-
ysis of the case tried in the Swedish Labor Court and cases taken to the administrative 
courts is based on detailed descriptions of the cases (including the parties’ arguments 
and claims) published together with the issued judgments. Records and reports from the 
Swedish Tax Agency have also been used, as well as reports and comments on the cases 
in the media. 
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Seven open interviews with informants representing Transport, the Dutch trade 
union FNV Bondgenoten, the Swedish Association for Road Transport Companies and 
the Swedish Tax Agency have given information about concrete cases as well as the 
broader social context of the problem of misclassification of drivers’ employment sta-
tus. The interviews, which were carried out face-to-face or by telephone, were centered 
around a few main questions about the informants’ and their organizations’ opinion of 
this problem: why and in which context it appeared, which sectors and drivers it con-
cerned, and how the organizations dealt with the problem. The interview with the Dutch 
trade union officer was focused on an article in the Dutch Transport of Goods by Road 
Act aimed to prevent fraudulent use of self-employment. After analyzing the recorded 
interviews, the informants were contacted for updates and confirmation. The paper also 
uses reports, periodical press and other publications from Transport and the European 
Trade Union Federation (ETF), and from the industry. In addition, government reports 
and data from Statistics Sweden (SCB) and Trafikanalys (TRAFA) have been used, as 
well as reports and statistics from the EU. The text relates continually to relevant aca-
demic literature. 
It is difficult to get statistical data on the prevalence of work in the grey area, espe-
cially false self-employment, which is an illegal practice. Comparative analyses based 
on the European Working Condition Surveys suggest that the share of dependent self-
employment of total self-employment is low in the Scandinavian countries. According to 
a recent ILO study, the share ranged from 63% in Romania, 52% in Slovakia, 43% in 
the United Kingdom (UK) and Austria, 42% in Lithuania and Poland to 12% in Sweden 
and 11% in Denmark in 2015 (Williams & Lapyere 2017, pp. 17–18; cf. Eurofound 
2013, p. 8). As regards false self-employment, a Swedish survey among a sample of 9000 
persons aged 20–64 years indicated that 8.6% of the self-employed contractors provid-
ing services to other companies, authorities and organizations worked under conditions 
similar to subordinate employees (Engblom & Inganäs 2018).2
As in most other European and Nordic countries, the Swedish road freight trans-
port industry consists mainly of small companies (Eurostat 2015). The share of ‘local 
units’ (companies) without employees was around 42% in 2016, and this share has 
been fairly stable in the past 15 years (Statistics Sweden 2018).3 Using data from the 
European Labor Force Survey, Broughton et al. (2015) estimated that 6% of the Swedish 
heavy truck and lorry drivers were solo self-employed in 2013. However, this says noth-
ing about the prevalence of fraudulent use of self-employment. The present paper does 
not try to answer this question either. It can be mentioned though that Transport esti-
mated that there were around 1000 suspected cases of false self-employment in Sweden 
in autumn of 2012 (mainly among foreign drivers) (Harnesk 2012). The common use of 
multilevel subcontracting, and the fact that many foreign haulers and drivers working 
temporarily in Sweden are not registered in the country, make it even more difficult to 
assess the prevalence of the problem (Karlsson & Herding 2016). 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents the broader social context 
of the problem of low-wage competition and fraudulent use of self-employment in the 
Swedish road freight transport industry. In the following section, the significance of the 
flexible and mandatory notion of employee when identifying and tackling misclassifica-
tion of workers employment status is illustrated through concrete cases. This section also 
exemplifies and discusses the impact of the notion when considering new reforms aimed 
to protect workers in the grey area. The last section includes the concluding remarks.
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A deregulated and internationalized road  
freight transport market 
What then can be said about the broader social context of the problem of fraudulent 
use of self-employment in the Swedish road haulage industry? When addressing this 
question, it is important to consider the long-term development of the deregulation and 
internationalization of this market, as well as the problem of low-wage competition in 
the enlarged EU. 
Most countries in the Western World regulated the growing road freight trans-
port industry in the wake of the Great Depression in the early 1930s in order to 
curb oversupply and destructive competition. The aim was also to protect the rail 
freight transport sector from low-cost road transport. Governments introduced vari-
ous forms of market restrictions, such as entry control, capacity control and price 
control (OECD 1997; Belzer 2000). The intra-European road freight transport was 
strictly regulated as well, mainly through bilateral agreements (Bayliss 1998). This 
system remained for several decades, despite the fact that the Treaty of Rome (signed 
in 1957) prescribed a free transport market in the European Economic Community 
(EEC). However, it would take over 25 years, and a Judgment in the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), before the process of liberalization started in earnest.4 Along with the 
establishment of the EU Single Market, all quantitative restrictions that could inhibit 
full and equal access to the internal road freight transport market had to be lifted by 
the end of 1992 at the latest (Council Regulation EEC 1841/88). Cabotage (domestic 
transport carried out by foreign haulers) was to be gradually liberalized until 1998 
(OECD 1997; Bayliss 1998; Buelens & Michielsen 2016). In the 1990s, most Western 
European countries deregulated their domestic road freight transport markets as well. 
In Sweden and in the UK, however, this process had started already in the 1960s (Kritz 
1976; Bayliss 1998). 
Deregulation and internationalization of the road freight transport market have 
contributed to a strong decline in international transport performed by Swedish haulers. 
In 2015, international transport accounted for 8% of the total transport carried out by 
Swedish trucks in terms of ton kilometers (and 2% in terms of ton), most of it transport 
between Sweden and Norway (TRAFA 2017, pp. 9–13). Moreover, the share of foreign 
trucks operating on the domestic Swedish transport market has increased significantly 
(Sternberg et al. 2015; Transport 2018). 
Traditionally, freight forwarders have a central role in the Swedish road freight 
transport sector. The transport and forwarding companies AB Svenska Godsbilcentraler 
(ASG) and Bilspedition AB were long the main Swedish logistics, but at the turn of the 
century 2000 these companies were included in the German multinationals DHL and 
Schenker. The interviewed representatives for both the industry and the trade union 
consider that large forwarding agencies contribute to low-cost competition by pressing 
down transport prices, especially in the ‘truck tractor sector’ (Interview 1, 2, 3, 4; cf. 
Swedish Television 2013). However, the Industry Director at the Swedish Association 
for Road Transport Companies also emphasizes structural problems in this sector, such 
as oversupply and destructive competition. According to the Industry Director, many 
owner-drivers (self-employed) with a truck tractor have not been prepared to make the 
investments needed to pursue their business in a commercially sustainable way. Instead, 
they compete on the spot market, sometimes accepting prices at below cost in order to 
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win a contract. As these owner-drivers often are strongly dependent on a single principal 
(a forwarding agency or a transport company), they operate as dependent self-employed 
workers rather than independent contractors. Thus, they contribute to the problem of 
price dumping by exploiting themselves. To quote the Industry Director: ‘Literary, many 
owner-drivers drive themselves into poverty’ (Interview 1). 
Regulatory arbitrage
Many researchers have emphasized that market liberalization and economic integra-
tion in the EU have not been followed by a similar process of social harmonization 
(Scharpf 2009; Sitran & Pastori 2013; Bernaciak 2014; Cremers 2015; Buelens & 
Michielsen 2016). The possibility to exploit the difference between various national 
social and fiscal regimes (regulatory arbitrage) has facilitated the practice of social 
dumping in the EU (Berntsen & Lillie 2015). ‘Regime shopping’ has become common, 
especially after the enlargement of the EU into Central and Eastern Europe in the 2000. 
The road freight transport market has been mentioned as an illustrative example of this 
problem (Hilal 2008; Cremers 2014; Buelens & Michielsen 2016). Haulers in Northern 
and Western Europe use drivers from the new EU Member States in the former Eastern 
Bloc, while haulers in these regions, whose main competitive advantage is low labor 
costs, increasingly use drivers from countries outside the EU (ETF 2013, 2015; Trans-
port 2018). Another variant is to establish a subsidiary or a branch (often a letter-box 
company) in the newer EU countries and recruit drivers from non-EU countries to 
work in the West (Hilal 2008; Cremers 2014; Kummer et al. 2014; McGauran 2016: 
Transport 2018). 
The informants representing the trade unions and the industry all emphasize that 
these practices (including many variants) strongly affect the Swedish road freight trans-
port market as well. According to the leader of Transport’s road haulage section in 
Gothenburg, approximately 90% of the drivers carrying out port-trucking in the region 
are drivers from Eastern Europe and the Balkans working mainly for foreign road haul-
age companies, but sometimes also for Swedish companies. 
Today, many trucks are registered in Bulgaria, while the drivers mainly come from North 
Macedonia. They have both a Macedonian and Bulgarian citizenship so they can work 
freely in the EU. They often live in the trucks for months and they are paid a fraction of 
the Swedish wage level. By crossing the borders to Norway or Denmark once a week, the 
trucks can carry out domestic transport for longer periods in Sweden without formally 
breaking the EU regulation on cabotage. (Interview 2)
This pattern can also be found around other big ports, such as in the Öresund area, as 
well as around the inland terminals for combined (multimodal) transport. Truck trans-
port accounts for a shorter leg at the beginning and end of the transport chain. Haulers 
who have access to the occupation and to the market for transport of goods between 
the EU Member States are entitled to carry out these legs, which also may include the 
crossing of a frontier (Council Directive 92/106/EEC, Article 4). Hence, many foreign 
haulers constantly perform cabotage or combined transport in the Scandinavian region 
(Interview 2 and 3, Sternberg 2014; Transport 2018). 
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 9  ❚  Number S6  ❚  May 2019 39
Drivers carrying out these forms of transport are generally paid on the basis of the 
(low) statutory minimum wages in their home countries in the former Eastern Bloc or 
in the Balkans, and on top of that distance-based pay and daily allowances (which are 
not subject to social security contributions). Thus, while the haulers can strongly reduce 
labor costs, the system means precarious work and poor social protection of the drivers 
(Interview 1, 3; CNR 2016; Haidinger 2017; Transport 2018). Payment per mile or on 
the basis of the amount of load is not allowed in the EU, ‘if such payments challenge 
road safety and/or encourages infringement of social regulations’ (Regulation EC No 
561/2006, Article 10:1). However, this formulation is vague, making the regulation easy 
to circumvent. 
Fraudulent use of self-employment in the road freight transport market has been 
identified to various extent in different countries in the EU (Broughton et al. 2015; 
Haidinger 2017). In Sweden, this practice has been found mainly among foreign haulers 
operating temporarily in the country, and among Swedish haulers who have recruited 
self-employed drivers from the newer EU countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Thörnquist 2013, 2015; Karlsson & Herding 2016). The cases discussed below con-
cern the latter.
Identifying and tackling misclassification of drivers 
Researchers have increasingly discussed whether the binary divide between employment 
and self-employment really corresponds with the flexible forms of employment used 
in today’s labor market (Ds. 2002:56; Engblom 2003; Källström & Malmberg 2016; 
Verhulp 2017). Nonetheless, it is of central importance to keep a clear analytic distinc-
tion between these two categories. Subordinate employment and self-employment are 
governed by different areas of law—labor law and commercial law respectively—which 
implies fundamental differences in workers’ rights and protection. While the purpose of 
labor law is to protect the weaker party in the labor market (the employee), commercial 
law is based on the rationale of the market forces (Perulli 2003). 
The civil-law notion of employee demarcates the personal scope of labor law and 
in principle also the collective agreement. In Sweden, as well as in the other Nordics, 
the notion of employee is wide and flexible and can adjust to structural changes in the 
labor market. This helps to protect workers with an unclear or disguised employment 
status. Moreover, the notion is mandatory, which implies that the courts’ opinion of 
an employment relationship takes precedence over the opinion of the contracting par-
ties. This helps to prevent misclassification of workers and circumvention of labor law 
legislation (Källström 2002; Engblom 2003; Rönnmar 2004; Sigeman & Sjödin 2017). 
The Swedish Employment (Co-Determination in the Workplace) Act (Medbestämmand-
lagen, MBL), which regulates the relationship between employers and employees, also 
covers persons who are not formally employed but work under similar conditions as 
employees (‘dependent contractors’).5
In unclear cases, the Swedish Labor Court shall ultimately decide the true employ-
ment status of a worker on a case-by-case procedure taking all relevant aspects into 
consideration. As in most other countries, the Swedish and Nordic courts use a set of 
criteria in this process. Among the criteria indicating a regular employment relationship 
are: that there is an agreement between the parties; that the worker performs the work 
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personally for a certain period of time and in exchange for payment; that the worker is 
subordinated to the management and control of the employer; and that the employer 
provides the worker with tools, machinery and raw material and bears the financial 
and entrepreneurial risk in the production (Adlercreutz 1964; Källström 2002; Sigeman 
& Sjödin 2017). As Verhulp (2017, p. 5) points out, the most important aspects when 
evaluating whether a person is genuinely or falsely self-employed are ‘1) whether there 
is legal subordination between the parties, 2) whether the person runs a financial and 
commercial risk and 3) to what extent a person forms part of and is embedded in the 
economic unit or business of the employer’. 
An important test case
Over the past 10 years, Transport and the Swedish Tax Agency have both been involved 
in longstanding legal disputes with a large road freight transport company, a family 
company owned by a married couple.6 The company, which was declared bankrupt 
in 2017, had a truck fleet of 120–145 truck tractors but no employed drivers. Instead, 
the hauler recruited self-employed drivers from the newer EU countries (mainly from 
Poland) to work temporarily in the company. The trade union, however, considered that 
the drivers worked in fact as employees, and that they were deliberately misclassified as 
self-employed.7 This case, which gained great public attention, illustrates very clearly the 
significance of the mandatory notion of employee when identifying and tackling misclas-
sification of workers’ employment status. 
The company had staffed the trucks with self-employed drivers from the former 
Eastern Bloc, mainly from Poland, since 2005. The drivers generally worked in periods 
of six months. After two months in their home countries, they returned for a new period 
of work. This also meant that they did not pay income tax in Sweden (Thörnquist 2013). 
In 2010, the owners registered a new company, a staffing and forwarding agency (here-
inafter ‘the staffing agency’). According to the contract between the companies, the role 
of the new company was to provide the haulage company with ‘driver services’, which in 
practice meant that the staffing agency should intermediate self-employed drivers from 
the newer EU Member States to the hauler.8 Even though Transport as well as the Tax 
Agency had begun to pay special attention to haulage companies with several truck trac-
tors but no employed drivers, the owners did not hide the purpose of their business idea. 
For example, they made no secret of the fact that they could save around 50% of the 
labor cost for employed Swedish drivers by using self-employed Polish drivers (Swedish 
Television 2011). In a press interview in the autumn of 2012, one of the owners (also the 
managing director) declared: 
For a haulage company carrying out domestic transport delivering parcels, for example, it 
is still possible to have Swedish drivers. The trucks start in the morning and return back 
home in the evening. Our trucks, on the other hand, can be on the road for a couple of 
weeks, and this means quite another cost level, including allowances with all it entails. It 
is simply not possible to use Swedish drivers.9
In November 2012, the trade union took the family company to the Swedish Labor 
Court claiming infringement of the collective agreement.10 The concrete case concerned 
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the employment status of a Polish driver, who had lived in Sweden for some time, and 
who had worked in the haulage company for three months in the summer of 2011. In 
the autumn, the driver contacted Transport claiming that the employer had misclassi-
fied him as self-employed, even though he had worked as an employee during the whole 
period. According to the driver, the haulage company had employed him in June, but 
after some weeks, the managing director had told him to register an enterprise in Poland 
and sign a contract for services11 with the company’s staffing agency to get paid for the 
work. The managing director, on the other hand, maintained that the company had 
engaged the driver as a self-employed subcontractor from the beginning. Neither the 
driver nor the hauler was organized, but the company had signed a so-called application 
agreement (hängavtal) with Transport in 2005. This meant that the trade union could 
claim infringement of the collective agreement.12 When negotiations between the central 
social partners failed, the trade union decided to take the case to the Labor Court requir-
ing the family company to pay SEK 400.000 in damages. 
The trade union, which had the burden of proof (together with the driver), empha-
sized that the driver had used the company’s truck and the other equipment needed to 
carry out the work, and that he had not taken own economic or entrepreneurial risk. 
Nor had he been able to work for any other client during the summer. Moreover, the 
union considered that the driver had entirely worked under the management and con-
trol of the haulage company. The role of the staffing agency had only been to mediate 
the drivers’ payment in order to conceal the fact that the haulage company was the real 
employer. Transport therefore claimed that the driver had worked as an employee in the 
haulage company. 13 Referring to these criteria, the Labor Court came to the same con-
clusion. In the judgment that was issued in December 2013, the Court declared:
According to the Labor Court, the haulage company cannot escape the mandatory notion 
of employee by signing a contract for services with the driver via the other company and 
by letting this company handle the payment for the work.14
This case illustrates very clearly the significance of mandatory notion of employee when 
assessing a worker’s true employment status and tackling cases of supposed misclassifica-
tion. Neither the trade union nor the Labor Court considered that the agreement between 
the driver and the staffing agency proved that the driver had worked as an independent 
contractor. Instead, they made an overall assessment of his working conditions, taking 
into account all relevant circumstances. Westregård (2016, p. 203) emphasizes that an 
important evidentiary fact for the Labor Court’s final judgment was that the driver had 
reason to believe that he had worked as an employee under the haulage company.
The judgment was a precedent and a victory for the driver and for the trade union, 
even though the union only received one-fourth of the required amount of damage. 
However, the judgment did not put an end to the use of nominally self-employed Eastern 
European drivers, neither in the family company nor among other haulage companies 
which had adopted the same business idea. 
Transport intended to pursue a second case in the Labor Court comprising the other 
drivers from Central and Eastern Europe (around 135 drivers), who worked in the fam-
ily company under the same conditions as the above-mentioned Polish driver. Again, the 
trade union claimed infringement of the collective agreement, requiring SEK 20 Million 
in damage this time. However, since no one of these drivers was willing to participate in 
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the process, and the Labor Court clearly declared in the judgment of the first case that 
issues on workers’ employment status must be tried on a case-by-case basis, Transport 
had to withdraw this case and agreed to resolve the dispute through conciliation (Inter-
view 3; Örneborg 2014). 
This example shows that taking suspected cases of false self-employment to court 
can be a complicated matter for trade unions, as workers—not least labor migrants—
may hesitate to participate in fear of losing their jobs (cf. Engblom & Inganäs 2018; 
SOU 2018, p. 49). While the first case exemplifies the strength of the mandatory notion 
of employee and how it can be used to protect workers from being misclassified, the 
planned second case illustrates the limitation of labor law in this sense, as each case must 
be tried individually—even in cases where workers work under the same conditions in 
the same company. This also means that the individual worker must be prepared to 
participate in the legal process. The chairman of Transport made a comment on this fact 
in a press interview:
The judgment indicates very clearly that we must show in every single case that there really 
is a disguised employment relationship. This is a prevalent practice, but it is very difficult 
to prove. If we can’t bring drivers to declare in court that they are false self-employed 
workers, we can’t do much.15
However, the chairman, as well as the trade union lawyer and the international expert at 
Transport’s head office in Stockholm, also emphasized that the existence of a precedent 
improved the trade union’s possibilities to handle issues on misclassification of drivers’ 
employment status through negotiations (Interview 4; Lindkvist 2014; Örneborg 2014). 
The drivers’ reluctance to participate in the case Transport planned to pursue on 
their behalf illustrates the complex relationship between work in the grey area as a mode 
of exploitation and a strategy for survival. The fact that Transport could not realize this 
plan, also for legal reasons, helps to explain why the family company and a number of 
other haulers continued to use nominally self-employed drivers from the former Eastern 
Bloc. At the same time, the Swedish Tax Agency launched several projects aimed to curb 
evasion of taxes and social security contributions in the road freight transport industry, 
including targeted controls of single companies (Interview 5, 6; Karlsson & Herding 
2016).
Offensive tax controls 
The Swedish Tax Agency and the administrative courts use largely the same set of crite-
ria as the Labor Court when assessing whether a person is employed or self-employed. 
As regards issues on who is responsible for paying social security contributions, a prin-
cipal or client can be obliged to pay social fees for both employed and self-employed 
workers who lack A1 forms, as well as for self-employed who are not registered for 
Swedish business tax (F-tax) and for self-employed who in fact work as employees. As 
Westregård (2016, p. 203) has pointed out, ‘social security legislation and social fees 
might play a more important part than labor law when dealing with the problem of 
false self-employed in the road haulage industries’. Moreover, in tax law, the employer 
has the burden of proof. 
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The Tax Agency’s targeted controls of companies in the road freight transport 
industry, which resulted in an increasing number of amended tax assessments, support 
this suggestion. As regards the family company, the Tax Agency considered that the vast 
majority of the self-employed drivers from Central and Eastern Europe had worked 
under conditions essentially similar to those of employed workers. With few exceptions, 
the drivers could neither present F-tax certificates nor A1 forms showing that they were 
covered by the social security legislation in their home countries or elsewhere. In gen-
eral, they did not work as self-employed in their home countries either. This meant that 
the owners of the haulage company and the staffing agency had to pay social security 
contributions for these drivers as they had performed the work in Sweden. In November 
2012, the Tax Agency required the haulage company to pay over SEK 10 million for 
unpaid employer contributions and tax surcharge (Lindkvist 2012). Half a year later, the 
staffing agency was required to pay over SEK 14 million. Soon afterwards, the company 
filed for bankruptcy (Blomquist 2015).
The owners contested both these decisions in Administrative Court, but the judg-
ments were in favor of the Tax Agency. Among other things, the Court emphasized that 
the drivers had used the company’s trucks and other equipment needed to carry out the 
work, that they had worked under the direction and control of the haulage company, 
and that they had not been able to have any other assignments when working in the 
company. As regards the staffing agency, the Court made a certain reduction of the dam-
age, as some more drivers had presented A1 certificates.16 Finally, the Administrative 
Court of Appeal confirmed the decisions.17
Despite the severe economic consequences, the owners established a new labor 
market intermediary, from which they should hire self-employed drivers recruited 
from central and Eastern Europe. Officially, two members of the administrative staff 
had started the company, but the managing director of the haulage company owned 
the capital stock. In addition, the company used staffing agencies in Poland, Romania 
and the UK. After a new meticulous revision of this version of the business model, 
including control of bank accounts, book-keeping, tachographs and driving logs, the 
Tax Agency concluded that the only role of the Swedish staffing agency, as well as 
the labor market intermediaries situated abroad, was to mediate the payment from 
the haulage company to the drivers, and thus conceal that the drivers were, in fact, 
employed in this company.18 As a result, the Tax Agency required the company to 
pay another SEK 5.8 million for unpaid employer contributions and tax surcharge 
(Blomquist 2016).
The Tax Agency’s drive in the road freight transport sector also revealed several 
other haulage companies, which used or had used the same business idea as the fam-
ily company. Most of these haulers had recruited self-employed drivers from Central 
and Eastern Europe via own or external intermediaries (in practice letter-box compa-
nies) to conceal the drivers’ real employment status (Interview 5; Karlsson & Herding 
2016; Andersson 2017). The Tax Agency has therefore required an increasing number of 
employers to pay large sums of money for unpaid social security contributions. More-
over, the hundreds of foreign drivers, who have worked in these companies, or in the 
family company, have to pay Swedish income tax retroactively.19 Several companies have 
appealed to the administrative courts, but with few exceptions, the judgments have been 
in favor of the Tax Agency (have Interview 5, 6; Blomquist 2015; Karlsson & Herding 
2016; Norberg 2016; Andersson 2017). 
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The mandatory notion of employee and proposals on new regulations 
As has been illustrated above, the mandatory notion of employee implies that the opin-
ion of the courts takes precedence over the opinion of contracting parties in legal dis-
putes on a worker’s employment status. Moreover, the flexible character of the notion 
implies that it can adjust to changes in the labor market. These characteristics are of 
central importance for the protection of workers in the grey area. Experts and lawmak-
ers have therefore been restrictive when it comes to proposals on new regulations aimed 
to protect workers in the grey area. For example, the idea of extending the protection 
of labor law and social security law (in part or as a whole) to a ‘third legal category’ 
between employment and self-employment has not gained support among Swedish law-
makers (Legislative Inquiry Ds 2002, p. 256). 
Another example of direct relevance to the road freight transport industry concerns 
the possibility to introduce the so-called Dutch model for preventing fraudulent use of 
self-employment and temporary agency work in this industry. The Dutch model refers 
here to the Dutch Transport of Goods by Road Act (Article 2.11), which states that 
haulage companies must employ the drivers they engage to drive their trucks. The par-
ties shall set up a formal agreement stating (1) that the hauler shall bear the cost and 
entrepreneurial risk for the transport, and (2) that the driver shall work as an employee 
under the management and control of the hauler.20 Haulage companies can engage sub-
contractors with own trucks and own transport licenses that entitles them to carry out 
transport in the EU. They may also use temporary work agencies at peak times, but the 
agencies must be certified and the drivers’ wages and working conditions must be in line 
with the Dutch collective agreement. According to the trade union FNV Bondgenoten, 
the regulation has worked successfully, and the social partners have jointly defended the 
model against ‘neoliberal criticism’. The opponents’ main argument has been that the 
Act challenges the free and non-discriminatory EU transport market. However, a parlia-
mentary investigation that evaluated the regulation at the beginning of the 2010 came to 
the conclusion that it was consistent with EU law and should be retained (Interview 7).
The Dutch model has gained interest in other EU countries as well, for example, 
in Sweden. On the recommendation of the Transport Committee in the Swedish parlia-
ment, Riksdagen, the center-right alliance government (in office 2006–2014) commis-
sioned the Swedish Transport Agency in 2012 to look over the possibility to introduce a 
similar regulation in Sweden.21 However, the Transport Agency did not recommend such 
a reform, referring to the protection the mandatory notion of employee and the Employ-
ment Protection Act (Lagen om anställningsskydd) provide. The Transport Agency 
underlined that the mandatory character of the notion of employee implied that the 
contracting parties were not entitled to decide the true employment status of a person on 
their own. In fact, the reform would mean a stronger emphasize on the contract between 
the parties. Accordingly, the Transport Agency found that the Dutch model was not 
consistent with the legal practice in the Swedish Labor Court. The government rejected 
the idea on the same grounds. The government also feared that the Dutch model would 
limit the entrepreneurial freedom, and probably challenge the freedom of movement of 
labor and services in the EU as well.22
In the 2014 general election campaign, the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the 
Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) launched a 10-point program for Law and 
Order in the Labor Market (Ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden), which suggested 
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the introduction of the Dutch model (LO 2014). However, the red-green government 
that took office after the general election did not make any attempts to introduce the 
model. The Minister of Infrastructure declared in 2015 that the government had no 
such plans. In line with the Transport Agency and the former center-right alliance gov-
ernment, the Minister considered the model was not consistent with the mandatory 
Swedish notion of employee. Instead, the government should prioritize other reforms 
to promote fair transport, such as reinforced road-side checks and a stricter customer 
responsibility when purchasing transport services.23
For some years now, the trade union Transport runs an own permanent project, 
called Law and Order in the Road Haulage Industry (Ordning och reda i åkeribran-
schen). The aim is to combat and prevent fraudulent use of self-employment and tem-
porary work agencies, as well as other fraudulent practices in the liberalized and inter-
nationalized road freight transport market (Transport 2018). According to the leader of 
the project, the use of self-employed foreign drivers in the Swedish road freight trans-
port companies has decreased in the past few years. He considers that Transport’s and 
the Swedish Tax Agency’s intense work against unfair competition and social fraud, 
and the fact that there exists a precedent in the Labor Court, have contributed to this 
development. The project leader also emphasizes that Swedish and foreign road freight 
transport companies use other ways to press down labor costs by practicing increasingly 
advanced forms of regime shopping and exploiting loopholes in EU regulations applying 
to the road freight transport market, such as the rules on cabotage, combined transport 
and the posting of workers. 
Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper was to illustrate through concrete cases the significance of the 
flexible and mandatory Swedish notion of employee when identifying and tackling mis-
classification of truck drivers as self-employed workers. The paper also discussed why 
and in which sectors this form of fraudulent contracting of work has appeared in the 
road freight transport industry in recent decades. Regarded in the wider social context, 
the use of false self-employed drivers can be related to the free movement of labor and 
services and the possibility exploit the economic and social cleft between East and West 
in the EU. The deregulation and liberalization of the road haulage market and the lack 
of social harmonization within the EU help to explain the complex background to the 
problem as well.
In the Swedish road freight transport industry, the use of false self-employment has 
mainly been identified in nonspecialized long-distance trucking and port-trucking car-
ried out by truck tractors pulling trailers and containers from one location to another. 
This sector (the truck tractor sector), in which drivers are easily interchangeable, is 
also subject to intense international low-cost competition and hard price pressure from 
freight forwarder. Moreover, the sector suffers from internal structural problems, such 
as oversupply and destructive competition. Among other things, many owner-drivers are 
dependent self-employed rather than independent contractors. 
The paper focused on Swedish haulers who have recruited self-employed drivers 
from Central and Eastern Europe—drivers who have in fact worked as employees, but 
without the rights and protection genuinely employed workers are entitled to. In this 
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way, the haulers have been able to reduce labor costs and gain flexibility. The analysis 
indicated that the involvement of labor market intermediaries, which often have been 
revealed as ‘letter-box companies’, has been a vital part of this practice. The increasing 
use of letter-box companies is currently as one of the most urgent issues in the European 
road haulage market (Cremers 2014; McGauran 2016; European Parliament 2017; 
Transport 2018). 
The case of false self-employment that was tried in the Swedish Labor Court illus-
trated very clearly the significance of the mandatory Swedish notion of employee when 
identifying and tackling disguised employment. The Labor Court did not consider that 
the contract for services between the Polish driver and the haulage company’s staffing 
agency proved that the driver really had worked as an independent contractor. Instead, 
the Court made a holistic assessment of the relationship between the haulage company, 
the staffing agency and the driver, taking into account all relevant aspects of his working 
conditions, including the driver’s own conception of his employment status. The second 
case, which Transport could not pursue in the Labor Court as each case must be tried 
individually, illustrated that the crucial issue for the trade unions when taking cases of 
false self-employment to court is that the individual worker really is prepared to partici-
pate in the legal process. 
The fact that no one of the other 135 self-employed Eastern European drivers in the 
haulage company was willing to take part in such a process also illustrates the complex 
relationship between work in the grey area as a mode of exploitation and a survival 
strategy, including the dilemma it implies for trade unions when tackling disguised or 
ambiguous forms of employment. This is an old problem that has become even more 
complicated in today’s internationalized labor market. In the Swedish road freight trans-
port industry, as well as in construction (Thörnquist 2013, 2015), suspected cases of 
false self-employment have mainly been found among migrant workers (cf. Broughton 
et al. 2015; Behling & Harvey 2015). It is reasonable to assume that these workers fall 
outside international comparative surveys on the prevalence false and dependent forms 
of self-employment based on the European Working Condition Surveys (Eurofound 
2013; Williams & Lapyere 2017). Thus, qualitative studies are needed to get a nuanced 
picture of the problem in different countries and industries. 
The aim of the Swedish Tax Agency’s offensive controls and audits in the road 
freight transport industry, which also included the drivers’ employment status, has 
naturally been to reveal and combat the evasion of taxes and social security contribu-
tions. However, the amended tax assessments, and the economic consequences for those 
involved in fraudulent practices, have also helped to prevent exploitation of nominally 
self-employed drivers.
It is easy to agree that social security legislation and social fees may sometimes 
play a more important role than labor law when dealing with false self-employment 
(cf. Westregård 2016). The Tax Agency required the family company and many other 
haulage companies to pay social security contributions retroactively, not only for ‘self-
employed’ drivers, who according to the authority had in fact worked as employees, but 
also for drivers who could not present an F-tax certificate or an A1 form. In addition, 
hundreds of foreign drivers were required to pay Swedish income tax, including tax 
surcharge.
The paper also exemplified why the mandatory notion of employee has been an 
argument among Swedish lawmakers against proposals on new legislation aimed to 
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prevent exploitation of worker in the grey area. The center-right as well as red-green 
governments’ decisions to reject idea of the ‘Dutch model’ for preventing fraudulent use 
of self-employment provided an illustrative example of this policy. It is difficult to esti-
mate, however, if the real motive was to follow Swedish legal practice or to avoid chal-
lenging entrepreneurial freedom and the free movement of labor and services in the EU. 
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